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By the seventeenth century, there were calls to reform the English
legal system in order to remove some of the more arbitrary and unjust
elements. 6 The Puritan colonists arriving in Massachusetts Bay to build
their “city upon a hill” faced the necessity of establishing a new
government and used the opportunity to reform the law. 7 From the first
criminal prosecutions conducted in the new colony, the Common Law
began to be adapted to fit their religious beliefs and to implement reforms. 8
Given the messianic nature of the colony’s existence, criminals in
Massachusetts Bay were especially scorned as they were not merely
breaking the King’s law, but God’s law. 9 This led the colonists to continue
to act against the bodies of defendants and impose harsh punishments.
This article examines the issue of when punishment for a crime
crosses from being a legitimate punishment to a dignity taking. In her
works, Bernadette Atuahene defines a dignity taking as instances when “a
state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from
owners or occupiers whom it deems to be sub persons without paying just
compensation and without a legitimate public purpose.” 10 The definition
has since been refined, “there must be involuntary property loss as well as
evidence of . . . intentional or unintentional dehumanization . . . or
infantilization . . . of dispossessed or displaced individuals or groups.” 11
The primary difference is the removal of the final element “without paying
just compensation and without a legitimate public purpose.” 12 It will be
shown that in criminal law, this change has the potential to greatly expand
the realm of dignity takings. To remedy these extraordinary takings,
something more than basic compensation is needed to restore what the

6. See generally DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640–1660, at
65–70 (1970).
7. See generally John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630), in 2 COLLECTIONS OF
THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 33, 44–46 (1838). See also DAVID THOMAS KONIG, LAW
AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629–1692, at 3–5, 16 (1979).
8. JOHN FELIPE ACEVEDO, HARSH MERCY: CRIMINAL LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 59–61 (2013).
9. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 190
(Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1966).
10. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 21 (2014).
11. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene,
Takings as a Sociolegal Concept]; see also Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity
Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework to Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and
the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016).
12. ATUAHENE, supra note 10, at 21.
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person lost. 13 In her work, Atuahene focuses on the taking of real and
personal property, but in the realm of policing and criminal justice this
definition would not reach many of the takings that occur. 14 I have
previously argued that a dignity taking occurs when the police take a
person’s body through physical abuse or extra-judicial murder. 15 This paper
seeks to expand this theory into punishments inflicted by the state and in
different historical contexts.
Using approximately 6000 criminal cases from the Massachusetts Bay
Colony from 1630 to 1683, 16 this paper argues that criminals in
Massachusetts Bay were often subjected to punishments which amounted
to dignity takings, as their bodies were degraded and, at times, their
property confiscated. This study incorporates criminal cases from the Essex
County Quarterly Courts, the General Court, and Court of Assistants. I
decided to focus on these courts in order to gather a mixture of types of
cases while maintaining the ability to make comparisons without having to
worry about geographical variation and more importantly to have a set of
comparable cases, which occurred from 1630 to 1683
The seventeenth century was selected as it was a century of revolution
that began the transformation of English society to a modern one as well as
the founding of the North American colonies. 17 More importantly, the
modern conceptualization of dignity arose during this era; but the word has
another, older meaning, “honourable or high estate, position or estimation;
honour; degree of estimation, rank.” 18 This concept of dignity can be traced
back from mediaeval England to ancient Rome. 19 The modern definition is
reflected in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, most recently in the
13. Id. at 57; see also Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparation to Restoration: Moving Beyond
Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1444–
46 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Atuahene, supra note 13, at 1453–55; see also e.g., ATUAHENE, supra note 10, at
38–45.
15. John Felipe Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity Following Police Misconduct, 59
HOWARD L.J. 621, 628–29 (2016).
16. The cases used in the study were culled from the RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY
COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY (The Essex Institute 1913) [hereinafter ECCR]; RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND (Nathaniel B. Shurtleef ed.,
1854) [hereinafter RCMB]; RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY: 16301692 (John Noble ed., 1904) [hereinafter RCA]; and JOHN WINTHROP,
THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP, 16301649 (Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, & Leatitia Yeandle
eds., 1996). Tables containing the frequency of each standardized crime are reproduced at the end of my
dissertation, ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 319–44.
17. See generally STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION (2009).
18. Dignity,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
ONLINE
EDITION,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/52653?redirectedFrom=Dignity [https://perma.cc/H6CN-HA5X].
19. Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHILOSOPHY 251, 251–52 (1976) (tracing the meaning of the word
dignity from English through European languages).
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area of gay rights. 20 However, what is meant by Justices when they invoke
the concept of dignity has never been completely articulated. 21 This has led
some scholars to declare that the term has no meaning, but this pushes the
problem too far. 22 However, these concerns can be addressed by looking to
the older meaning of dignity. 23 Waldron has asserted, I think correctly, that
this meaning of dignity is commensurate with our modern legal notions of
dignity and therefore it should be viewed as a status. 24 Modern legal
systems therefore equate dignity with equality of worth. 25 The notion of
dignity being tied to equality arose with the revolutions of the seventeenth
through early nineteenth centuries, which did not seek to form a new order,
but rather, to raise all persons to the same degree of respect; “every man a
Brahmin.” 26
This brief history of dignity is also included as a response to a critique
of this paper that the concept of dignity cannot be applied retroactively as
from the seventeenth century forward modern notions of dignity were
circulating. 27 This proposition has the further advantage of highlighting
how law is tied to the society that formed it; law is contextual to the society
that formed it. 28 This is not to propose a Whigish view of history; there is
no certainty that everyday things are becoming better or leading toward a
certain goal nor that the increase in dignity that has occurred in the last 350
years shall continue indefinitely. 29 Nevertheless, there is change over time,
20. See Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J.
3076, 3076 (2014) (arguing that the anti-humiliation principle can be traced through the use of the term
dignity in Supreme Court cases and that civil rights violation trials could be a place to argue for
humiliation principle violations); see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
21. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172–76 (2011)
(noting that the term has been used when discussing the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as well as being invoked by both conservative and
liberal Justices).
22. See Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 BMJ 1419, 1420 (2003) (writing in the
context of medical ethics Macklin asserts that “[a]ppeals to dignity are either vague restatements . . . or
mere slogans,” and is especially critical of the concept death with dignity).
23. See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, & RIGHTS 30–33 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012)
(asserting that this older definition is what we mean by the concept of dignity).
24. Id. at 33 (noting that in modern societies, and particularly Western European ones, persons
are equated the respect formally reserved for the nobility).
25. Id. at 55–56 (providing the examples of peers having the ability to be tried in the House of
Lords).
26. Id. at 34 (citing to the work of Gregory Vlastos on the topic).
27. This criticism was raised by participants of the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association held in Seattle, Washington in May 2015.
28. WALDRON, supra note 23, at 34–36; see also LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN
INVITATION 3–5 (2008) (Rosen points to the concept that law as culture and culture as law to tackle
notion that law is derived from universal norms).
29. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 9–12 (1931) (describing
the error of the Whig interpretation of history as assuming that the actions of the past have are driven by

2017]

DIGNITY TAKINGS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

747

which enables us to recognize that the interplay between law and society,
for better or worse, and that the way we change one necessarily affects the
other. 30 This can be exemplified by the rapid change of policing in the last
300 years, as thief takers transformed into the Bow Street Runners, which
evolved into the modern Anglo-American police force. 31 The origin of
these transformations in the concept of dignity—combined with the rise of
the modern state in the seventeenth century and the theorization of the body
as property—makes the seventeenth century an ideal location to examine
the boundaries of Atuahene’s concept of dignity takings.
The theorization of dignity thus far proposed solves the historian’s
dilemma of contextualization, but simultaneously opens up a new danger; if
dignity is tied to society and society is constantly changing, then we can
imagine societies that do not respect the concept of dignity or even our
society denigrating dignity. 32 My hope is that, by following the older
definition of dignity, the debate, at least in the Anglo-American context,
can focus on instances where the state has taken the dignity of the people,
since all persons have the same equality of respect (roughly that of petite
noblemen) rather than worrying about tying dignity to certain rights.
Indeed, the Black Lives Matter movement’s call for dignity is reflected in
this definition, a call for equality before the law and equal treatment by law
enforcement. 33 If dignity is tied to society, then it is incumbent on every
member of that society to make the law more just and more equal; this was
something understood by the colonists who landed in what would become
the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
Section II of the paper will examine the concept of a person’s body as
their property, which is subject to dignity takings. Section III will discuss
the line between legitimate punishment and a punishment as a dignity
taking. Section IV will examine Massachusetts Bay as a case study for
dignity takings occurring in the context of criminal law. Section V will

our present concerns and the corollary of reading the past through the lens of present problems. The
culmination of this way of doing history is the false assumption that all of the past was inevitably
leading to improve society toward our present).
30. ROSEN, supra note 28, at 170–71 (discussing the anthropologic notion of cosmos, or cultural
system, as representing an interplay between society’s constructs in law and other conceptual areas).
31. See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 55–56, 65 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1986); see also THOMAS REPPETTO, AMERICAN POLICE: THE BLUE PARADE 1845–1945, A
HISTORY 18–22 (2010).
32. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 198–99 (citing to Michael Walzer, Rosen notes that although it
may not be possible to determine if something is absolutely right it is possible, using law as society
theorization, to determine if something is right for our society).
33. Acevedo, supra note 15, at 623.
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examine four cases in depth to see instances of when dignity restoration
was attempted in the colonial context.
II. THE BODY AS PROPERTY UNDER DIGNITY TAKINGS
During periods of upheaval (such as colonization, decolonization, civil
war, and war), states engage in extraordinary takings—the forcible
dispossession of land from those it deems to be enemies. 34 In her studies,
Atuahene has focused on the taking of lands during apartheid in South
Africa. 35 She has also demonstrated the applicability of the theory to a wide
range of instances in which groups were dehumanized or infantilized and
dispossessed of their property. 36 The concept is clearly applicable to
situations of internal displacement, genocide, apartheid and other
repressions. 37 However, the focus on real and personal property has left unincluded instances when, through enslavement, corporal punishment,
banishment, and death, the state works to take a person’s body from their
control.
I have previously asserted that the body is the property of an
individual; therefore, this section will seek to briefly restate that argument
as well as add to it. 38 The idea that you have a property interest in your own
body can be traced to the new formulations on the basis of government
articulated in the seventeenth century and the political theories of John
Locke in particular. 39 Locke asserts that every person “has a property in his
own person: this no body has any right to but himself.” 40 This proposition
became the basis of Locke’s theory of government presented in the Second
Treatise of Government. 41 The theoretical concept of a person’s right in
their body was still forming in the seventeenth century, spurred on by an

34. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
35. See generally ATUAHENE supra note 10, at 3–5. See also Atuahene, supra note 13 at 1423–
25.
36. Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property Rights in the Context of
Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 834–38 (2009).
37. Id.
38. Acevedo, supra note 15, at 626.
39. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
40. Id. at 19. As there was no standardized spelling in the seventeenth century in all quotations
the spelling and grammar will be left as in the original document without the use of sic; Sic erat
scriptum.
41. See generally id.
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increased interest in the relation of property and political theory brought on
by the instability of the English Revolutions. 42
The practice that a person’s body was property was widely practiced
during the seventeenth century; unfree labor was common in the British
Atlantic world with an active slave trade and the practice of indentured
servitude as a means for the lower sort of persons to reach North
America. 43 As troubling as unfree labor was in the seventeenth century, it
led to the direct valuation of persons’ bodies. 44 Indeed, Carol Rose
describes the freeing of slaves following the American Civil War as an
example of an extraordinary expropriation of property, although one that
was intended to correct the previous expropriation “of the slaves’ bodies
from themselves.” 45 Slaves themselves understood that their bodies had
value, a fact forced upon them as their only hope for freedom was to buy
themselves from their captors. 46 Also, the merchants who grew wealthy
from the unseemly trade certainly understood bodies were property. 47
Although never directly mentioning slavery, the Constitution of the
United States contains rights which imply a property interest in the body:
the Fourth Amendment (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures of
a person), Fifth Amendment (requiring due process before deprivation of
life), Eighth Amendment (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments),
Thirteenth Amendment (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude), and
Fourteenth Amendment (requiring due process before deprivation of life by
the states). 48 From these enumerated rights, the Supreme Court has
recognized a variety of implied interest related to bodily integrity and
control. 49 However, it appears that the courts have been reluctant to extend
42. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN (Penguin Books
1991); CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603–1714 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1980).
43. MARGARET R. HUNT, THE MIDDLING SORT: COMMERCE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY IN
ENGLAND, 1680–1780, at 4–8 (1996); see also PETER N. CARROLL & DAVID W. NOBLE, THE FREE AND
THE UNFREE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 83–84 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the transition of
southern colonies from relying on the unfree labor of indentured servants to that of slaves).
44. CARROLL & NOBLE, supra note 43, at 36–39.
45. Rose, supra note 34, at 24–25.
46. See, e.g., OLAUDAH EQUIANO, THE INTERESTING NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF OLAUDAH
EQUIANO, 132–34 (Robert J. Allison ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 2d ed. 2007) (1789).
47. See, e.g., DAVID HANCOCK, CITIZENS OF THE WORLD: LONDON MERCHANTS AND THE
INTEGRATION OF THE BRITISH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 1735–1785, at 172–75 (1995).
48. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VII, XIII, XIV.
49. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law as
interfering with right to privacy between consenting adults); see also, e.g., Stafford Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (upholding the bodily integrity of students against
unreasonable strip searches by officials); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking
down Connecticut law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives under the theory a right to privacy
implied by penumbras and emanation of the Constitution); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
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property interests in parts of the body removed as part of a medical
procedure for fear of the chilling effect on medical research. 50
In Moore v. Regents of University of California, the Court held that no
conversion occurred when doctors used cells, extracted from the plaintiff’s
spleen, to create a new cell line for which they obtained a patent; even
though they subsequently sold it to a pharmaceutical company.51 However,
the Court stated that, “Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of
his cells following their removal,” implying that he had possession while in
his body and could have contracted to retain it. 52 The discarded cells were
therefore akin to discarded garbage, free for the taking, although it is not
clear where the curb of the body is. 53 Indeed, the Court noted that it is
established law that a person has a property right in their likeness, which
cannot be appropriated for commercial use without payment. 54 An
implication of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery is that
the body of a person cannot be sold, thereby placing a category of property
beyond the marketplace. 55 The Thirteenth Amendment is of course just part
of the long history on legal restrictions on what a person may do with their
body. 56
There are certain legal scholars that would push the concept of a
property interest in the body to the extreme: that all labor or fruits of labor
cannot be taxed. 57 As J.W. Harris has noted, this strain of thought is not
dangerous unless it is taken too seriously, but more importantly, it is not
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down an Oklahoma eugenic based sterilization act as violating right
to procreation).
50. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487–88 (Cal. 1990).
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. at 488–89.
53. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (holding that garbage placed at the curb
has no reasonable expectation of privacy and has been discarded by the owner).
54. Moore, 793 P.2d at 490 (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819 (1979) and
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825–826 (9th Cir. 1974)).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”)
56. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 488 (2d ed. 1898) (noting that since the era of Bracton a person
who committed suicide would forfeit his goods to the Crown just as a felon would as punishment for his
actions); see also COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS: REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1660, WITH
THE SUPPLEMENTS TO 1672: CONTAINING ALSO, THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641 (William H.
Whitmore ed., 1889) [hereinafter BODY OF LIBERTIES]. The Body of Liberties are the oldest written
legal code of colonial English North America. The code proscribed death for anyone who “shall lye
with any beaste or bruite creature by Carnall Copulation . . . lyeth with mankind as he lyeth with a
woeman . . . if any person committeth Adultery.” However, the only persons who were put to death
under these laws were for bestiality and in one case for adultery therefore the laws were more symbolic
rather than literally used.
57. See generally, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 272–75 (1974).
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QHFHVVDU\ WR PDNH WKH DUJXPHQW IRU D GLJQLW\ WDNLQJ LQ WKLV SDSHU 7KLV
SDSHU GRHV QRW UHDFK WKHVH ODUJHU FODLPV DQG IRFXVHV LQVWHDG RQ WKH
SK\VLFDOERG\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDODVWKHSURSHUW\
,,,&5,0,1$/381,6+0(17$6',*1,7<7$.,1*6
7RTXDOLI\DVDGLJQLW\WDNLQJDWDNLQJPXVWPHHWWZRHOHPHQWV  DQ
LQYROXQWDU\ ORVV RI SURSHUW\ DQG   LQWHQWLRQDO RU XQLQWHQWLRQDO
GHKXPDQL]DWLRQ RU LQIDQWLOL]DWLRQ RI WKH GLVSRVVHVVHG LQGLYLGXDOV $V
PHQWLRQHGLQWKH,QWURGXFWLRQWKHRULJLQDOGHILQLWLRQDOVRUHTXLUHGWKDWWKH
WDNLQJ RFFXUUHG ZLWKRXW SD\LQJ MXVW FRPSHQVDWLRQ RU ZLWKRXW D OHJLWLPDWH
SXEOLF SXUSRVH ,Q PRVW LQVWDQFHV LW PDNHV VHQVH WR H[FOXGH WKH ILQDO
UHTXLUHPHQWEHFDXVHLWLVLOORJLFDOWKDWWKHUHFDQEHDOHJLWLPDWHUHDVRQWR
UHPRYHDSHUVRQ¶VGLJQLW\+RZHYHULQWKHDUHDRIFULPLQDOSXQLVKPHQW
WKLVHOHPHQWLVHVVHQWLDODVDOOSXQLVKPHQWFRQGXFWVVRPHIRUPRIGLJQLW\
KDUP RQ WKH SXQLVKHG LQGLYLGXDO %HIRUH D GHWDLOHG GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH
DFWLRQV RI WKH ODZV RI (QJODQG WKURXJK WKH HDUO\ HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\ DQG
0DVVDFKXVHWWV%D\LQWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\DPRUHJHQHUDOGLVFXVVLRQRI
ZKHQFULPLQDOVDQFWLRQVFDQHYHUTXDOLI\DVDGLJQLW\WDNLQJLVQHHGHG
7KHLQYROYHPHQWRIWKHVWDWHLQWKHSXQLVKPHQWRIDFULPLQDORIIHQGHU
LVXQTXHVWLRQHGWKHUHE\PHHWLQJWKHILUVWHOHPHQW%XWLQPRVWLQVWDQFHVRI
SXQLVKPHQWWKHVWDWHGRHVQRWIXOO\GHSULYHDSHUVRQRIWKHLUERG\LQVWHDG
WKHVWDWHXVHVLWIRULWVRZQHQGVIRUDOLPLWHGSHULRG+RZHYHULWKDVEHHQ
UHFRJQL]HG WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW RZHV VRPH FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU HYHQ
WHPSRUDU\ WDNLQJV ZKHQ WKH\ DUH UHSHDWHG RU VHYHUH WKHUHIRUH D GLJQLW\
WDNLQJ FDQ HYHQ RFFXU LI WKH WDNLQJ LV WHPSRUDU\ 7KH LQWLPDF\ RI ERGLO\
SURSHUW\KDVOHGWRKHLJKWHQHGSURWHFWLRQEHIRUHWKHVWDWHFDQLQWUXGHLQWR
LW 1HYHUWKHOHVV SXQLVKPHQWV LQIOLFWHG RQ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V ERG\ RWKHU
WKDQFDSLWDOSXQLVKPHQWGRQRWGHVWUR\WKHERG\EXWQHYHUWKHOHVVWKHUHLVD
WHPSRUDU\WDNLQJ$VVHWRXWLQVHFWLRQWZRRIWKLVSDSHUDSHUVRQ¶VERG\
FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGWKHLUSURSHUW\DQGDVDSHUVRQFHUWDLQO\RFFXSLHVWKHLU
RZQ ERG\²WKXV HYHQ XQGHU D GH MXUH VODYH UHJLPH D GLJQLW\ WDNLQJ
RFFXUV²WKH WKLUG SDUW RI WKH WHVW LV PHW 7KLV OHDYHV WKH IRXUWK DQG ILIWK
HOHPHQWVWREHVDWLVILHG
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Unlike the first element, dehumanization and the legitimacy of the
state’s purpose can be context-specific, especially with regard to criminals.
In the South African case, and indeed in most settler colony contexts, the
dehumanization is evident in the racial ideology of colonial officials. 65
However, in the area of criminal law, the narrative of who the criminals are
is often far more subtle than in colonial racism. 66 A society’s ideological
agenda drives the way convicts are viewed, demonized, or pitied. 67 The
dehumanization of criminals may not be as obvious as white colonial
leaders calling Africans “savages,” but it can still lead to a skewing of
punishments to being overly severe, and in fact dehumanizing, especially
as all offenders get associated with the most severe ones. 68
The punishment for treason is a troubling area in the laws of England
as the punishment inflicted—hanging, drawing, and quartering—was
clearly designed to inflict suffering and to destroy the dignity of the
condemned. 69 Punishment for treason was divided by gender; men were to
be hung, drawn and quartered, while women would be burnt at the stake 70:
1. That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk;
though usually a sledge or hurdle is allowed, to preserve the offender
from the extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement.
2. That he be hanged by the neck, then cut down alive. 3. That his
entrails be taken out, and burned, while he is yet alive. 4. That his head
be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into four parts. 6. That his head
and quarters be at the king’s disposal. 71

Although it was held that the monarch could not alter the sentence of
the condemned, they could simply order the beheading, if included, and
omit the remainder of the punishment. 72 By the end of the seventeenth
century, this had changed; hanging, drawing, and quartering being reserved
for rebel leaders, while nobles were beheaded and the rabble were simply
hung. The decline should not be seen as a move away from the body, as
65. See ATUAHENE, supra note 10 at 30–34; see also Bernadette Atuahene, Property Rights & the
Demands of Transformation, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 766, 767–79 (2010); Bernadette Atuahene, Property
& Transnational Justice, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 65, 66–68 (2010) [hereinafter Property &
Transnational Justice].
66. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81–82 (1997).
67. Id. at 101–33.
68. See Joseph H. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 253–54 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009).
69. COKE, supra note 5, at 210 (pagination duplicative in the original).
70. Id. at 210–11 (noting that women were to be drawn and burnt, never beheaded or hanged, for
petite or high treason).
71. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 92.
72. Id.
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Foucault asserted; the English continued to regularly implement this
punishment as an expediency brought about by the number executed for
treason. 73 As the entire goal of this gruesome punishment was the
preservation of order, it necessarily targeted the dignity of the criminal and
thus was intentionally a dignity taking under the current definition.
Treason is also fraught with difficulties, as it implicates the legitimacy
of the regime imposing it. In the seventeenth century, it was not clear if
England would be an absolute monarchy, republic, or constitutional
monarchy. 74 The instability of the era made reprisals especially harsh on all
sides. 75 Treason is also problematic, as it could only be tried in England
and not in the colonies during the seventeenth century, and therefore it does
not appear directly in the records of the colony (although the crime of
disrespect of a magistrate does). 76 For these reasons, treason has been
excluded from this study. More refined questions are needed in the area of
criminal law and dignity takings: was the dignity taking justified in the
criminal context? Did the punishment serve a larger societal good?
Massachusetts Bay was chosen as the focus of this study, as the
colonists attempted to reform the harshest aspects of the Common Law,
while starting to create what would become a uniquely American legal
system. 77 The use of historical examples as the basis for analysis will
enable a disinterested analysis of dignity takings in the criminal context, as
well as demonstrate the strength of the concept of dignity takings by
applying it across temporal and legal boundaries. The seventeenth century
also provides a much clearer example of cruel and unusual punishment, as
it involves a greater variety of punishments inflicted upon defendants’
bodies, and in England moved beyond the body to direct taking of real and
personal property.

73. See FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 8–10 (describing the decline of the spectacle of punishment).
But see 1 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF
JAMES II 480, 482–83 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1962) (1848). During the Hampshire assize following
Monmouth’s failed rebellion, Judge Jeffreys ordered Alice Lisle burned the day of her trial after she
was convicted of harboring a fleeing rebel, even though the evidence appeared to demonstrate that she
had no knowledge that he had participated in the rising. Id. at 480, 482. In Dorsetshire, 292 persons
were sentenced to death, with seventy-four hanged, and the remainder transported to the colonies. Id. at
483.
74. See generally HILL, supra note 42.
75. See, e.g., ROBERT TOMBS, THE ENGLISH AND THEIR HISTORY 243 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
2015) (describing Oliver Cromwell’s order to give no quarter to royalist supporters).
76. See ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 282–86 (contempt of magistrate was punished as a
misdemeanor although many distracted and troublesome individuals were banished from the colony).
77. See BRIAN JARVIS, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND U.S. CULTURE 17–18 (2004).
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A.English Criminal Law
In Anglo-Saxon England, before the Norman Conquest, there existed
the policy that the lands and chattels of convicted felons, or those outlawed
for failure to appear in court, would be forfeited to the King. 78 As the
feudal system was based on the theory that all land was owned by the King
and then granted under a system of oaths of fidelity and loyalty, it was
believed that the commission of a felony was an affront to the king,
breaking all bonds. 79 The laws of property for married spouses made this
particularly problematic as all personal property was vested solely in the
husband. 80 Therefore, if a husband committed a felony, all of his lands, all
lands acquired during marriage, and all personal property of the family
were forfeited to the Crown, although the wife would in theory keep any
real property that she entered the marriage with or inherited during the
marriage . 81 Finally, the blood of the felon was held to be corrupted so their
heirs could not inherit their titles; there would be no property to inherit as it
had been forfeited. 82
After the Conquest, as feudal land holdings became more complex,
the forfeiture of land to the Crown became problematic. Rarely, if ever,
was land owned in fee simple absolute; instead, it was held by tenures
related to the service owed to the higher lord by the tenant. 83 In theory, this
chain of lord and tenant duties could be indefinitely long (A holds of B
who holds of C who holds of X who holds of the King) and thereby posed a
problem if forfeiture occurred as a person could not demand service of the
King. It should be noted that those lower down the lord-to-servant chain
would be unaffected by the forfeiture of a higher up as they would in
theory shift their payment to the King. To protect the rights of the nobility,
the Magna Carta provided that, “[w]e will not retain beyond one year and
one day, the lands those who have been convicted of felony, and the lands
shall thereafter be handed over to the lords of the fiefs.” 84 This provision
proved a boon for lords who would gain the escheated property of felons
after the King had his way with the land, including wasting the production

78. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 442–43
(Liberty Fund 2010) (1929).; see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 476–77.
79. PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 442.
80. BAKER, supra note 2, at 484–85.
81. Id. at 484–86.
82. Id. at 501–02. But see POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 477.
83. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 232–39; see also BAKER, supra note 2, at 237–
38.
84. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 32 (1215).
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of the land for a year and a day. 85 Although the pool of nobles who
benefitted from forfeiture widened, it still deprived the felon’s family of
their property.
In England, the majority of risings and rebellions were led by
charismatic leaders or families. 86 Indeed, into the eighteenth century, the
Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 were led by James III and his son
Bonnie Prince Charlie. 87 Therefore, the confiscation of title and property
from noblemen convicted of treason did have a legitimate purpose, as it
disabled their families from leading future rebellions. However, this does
not provide a rational for the confiscation of a simple felon’s property.
Indeed, the amount of the estate often did not justify the defendant’s
resistance to the judicial system—which will be discussed below—or the
effort to force the trial. 88
Increasing the severity of the felony forfeiture was the harsh nature of
the penal system with the default punishment for all felonies and treason as
death, regardless of circumstances. 89 Common Law felonies included
murder, burglary, larceny, and arson.90 This would seem to be a small list
of crimes, but larceny included all thefts of items valued above twelve
pence 91(in 1630, a gallon of strong beer cost seventeen pence, a pound of
flour two pence, and a pound of mutton three pence) 92 and burglary
included any breaking into a dwelling at night with the intent to commit
any felony within a dwelling regardless if it was completed. 93 In England,
most felons were hung publicly, although those convicted of treason were
subjected to the far more gruesome drawing and quartering which included
being dragged naked on a sled to the place of execution, followed by brief
hanging (not to unconsciousness), emasculation, and disembowelment
before the body was quartered and burnt, although many were commuted to
beheading. 94 Women convicted of treason, including the murder of their

85. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 442.
86. See, e.g., BARRY COWARD, THE STUART AGE: ENGLAND 1603–1714, at 377–78, 355–61, 445
(3d ed. 2003).
87. LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION: 1707–1837, at 72, 79–85 (2d ed. 2005).
88. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 509 n.45; see, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 74–77.
89. 6 JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 1483–1558, at 512
(2003).
90. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 529–36; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 221–42.
91. There were twelve pence to the shilling and twenty shillings to the pound.
92. See Glob. Price & Income History Grp., English Price and Wages, 1209–1914, INT’L INST. OF
SOC. HISTORY (Apr. 10, 2006), http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php#united [https://perma.cc/L5HRMPMD].
93. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 532; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 227, 239.
94. See BAKER, supra note 89, at 588–89; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 77.
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husbands, were burned. 95 The goal of all of these public deaths was to
dehumanize the person as they died. Throughout the eighteenth-century,
prisoners were executed in a fair-like atmosphere and at times their bodies
were desecrated for macabre souvenirs by the crowed. 96
There were attempts to mitigate the severity of the system by
providing benefit of clergy for certain crimes (it could only be claimed
once by a person); of course, this required the defendant be male and either
literate or have memorized Psalm 51:14, the default verse for asserting
clergy. 97 In addition, royal pardons were often granted and juries acquitted
guilty persons to spare their lives. 98 Despite these attempts at mitigation,
the Common Law remained rigid in its application to the area of criminal
law. In addition, such attempts to reprieve defendants from death serve to
illustrate that many Englishman doubted the necessity of capital
punishment in many cases, thereby calling the legitimacy of the death
penalty into question.
The continued use of forfeiture through the end of the seventeenth
century is evidenced by the use of peine forte et dure to force a defendant
to accept a jury trial. 99 The use of juries to try criminal cases represents an
accident of history, as juries were the only method of finding proof in
criminal trials after trial by ordeal was abolished by the Fourth Laterine
Council and trial by battle fell into disuse. 100 Therefore, a defendant had to
elect to be tried by a jury, which naturally caused a problem if they stood
mute. 101 To force the defendant to enter a plea, any plea, the defendant
would be slowly pressed to death using heavy stones, this was called peine
forte et dure. 102 The benefit to enduring peine forte et dure was that the
defendant was never technically convicted of the crime and therefore their
property was not forfeited. 103 The practice was finally discontinued under
the reign of George III, although the imposition of death sentences for even
minor thefts continued into the nineteenth century. 104
95. BAKER, supra note 2, at 528.
96. ANDREA MCKENZIE, TYBURN’S MARTYRS: EXECUTION IN ENGLAND, 1675–1775, at 21–23
(2007).
97. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 513–15; see, e.g., The King v. Walter Thomas (1614) 80 Eng.
Rep. 1022, 1022; 2 Bulstrode 147, 147 (Eng.).
98. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 515–18; see also BAKER, supra note 89, at 512.
99. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 598–602; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at
74–77.
100. See LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 4–6.; see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 598–
602; BAKER, supra note 2, at 72–73.
101. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 508–09; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 75.
102. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 508–09; see also BEATTIE, supra note 31, at 337–38.
103. LABGEIN, supra note 4, at 75–76.
104. BAKER, supra note 2, at 509, 518.
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The imposition of forfeiture of all of a defendant’s property upon
conviction of a felony meets the criteria of a dignity taking; “there must be
involuntary property loss as well as evidence of the intentional or
unintentional dehumanization . . . or infantilization . . . of dispossessed or
displaced individuals or groups.” 105 That the goal of the state was to
dehumanize the defendants is demonstrated by the manner of their deaths.
In addition, the state was directly involved in confiscating all property from
convicted felons who were regarded as separate from society for breaching
the bonds of loyalty and fidelity. The death of the offender would fulfill the
goals of retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation, but it would also most
certainly enact a dignity taking. Indeed, if the body of the defendant is his
property, then there can be no more intimate taking enacted by the state
and—given the Bloody Code of England—the imposition of death was
often well out of proportion to the crime committed. The property
confiscation from felons appears wholly gratuitous, especially as the taking
served as a hardship more on the family of criminals than the defendant
themselves; as an exception, in instances of treason, as it would serve to
disable the traitor’s heirs from engaging in future insurrection.
B. Massachusetts Bay Reforms
The colonists who traveled to Massachusetts Bay sought to create a
model society based on biblical law as an example of reform for
England. 106 As part of this mission, they instituted reforms of the Common
Law, including the removing of corruption of blood, the forfeiture of
property, and the death penalty for property crimes while also introducing
procedural reforms, such as a requirement of two witnesses for felony
conviction and allowing defendant’s attorneys. 107 The reforms instituted by
the Bay colonists were part of a larger, early, seventeenth-century
movement for law reform going on within the Common Law.108
The colony’s charter required that they apply the Common Law, but
as soon as the colonists reached the Bay Colony they began to alter the
Common Law of England in the way it was applied. 109 For example, of the
fifty-three persons convicted of property crimes between 1630 and 1642,

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 11, at 178.
See generally WINTHROP, supra note 16.
BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 35, 43.
See generally VEALL, supra note 6, at 65–70.
See generally CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629).
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none were sentenced to death, 110 although some of the items taken were
worth more than twelve pence. 111 The removal of forfeiture and corruption
of blood in Massachusetts Bay is evidenced by the elimination of peine
forte et dure in the colony. In December of 1634, Dorothy Talibe became
the first person to stand mute in the colony when she was charged with
murdering her three year old daughter, Difficult Talibe. 112 Governor
Winthrop threatened her with pressing, which induced her to enter a plea of
guilty, but it is not clear if he intended to go through with the procedure.113
The next instance of someone standing mute occurred in May 1661, when
two accused Quakers, Peter Peirson and Judah Broune, refused to enter a
plea before the Court of Assistants, but in these instances, pleas of not
guilty were assumed to have been made so the trial could proceed. 114 The
only instance of someone being subjected to peine forte et dure was Giles
Cory who was pressed to death when he refused to plea during the Salem
Witchcraft Trials. 115 Cory’s case is an anomaly, as the Common Law of
England was in use during the Salem trials as a result of the new charter
granted to the colony following the Revolution of 1688. 116 The colonists in
North America were thus able to remove both the forfeiture of a felon’s
property and the corruption of blood following a felony conviction, which
worked a dignity takings on both the condemned and their families under
the Common Law of England.
Despite the immediate changes in the application of the Common
Law, many colonists wanted a written code of laws, which articulated the
changes made to the law and the rights of colonists. 117 Of particular
concern was the discretionary power of the magistrates when imposing
sentences on the accused. 118 If the law of the colony was to be based on the
word of God then the punishments given in the Bible should be rigidly
110. See ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 12–13, 319–44 (giving an example of the abandonment of the
“Bloody Code,” which imposed capital punishment for property crimes, by colonists in Massachusetts
Bay; and providing a summary of all crimes from the founding of the colony through the Glorious
Revolution).
111. See, e.g., 2 RCA, supra note 16, at 99.
112. 1 ECCR, supra note 16, at 6.
113. WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 271–72.
114. 4 RCMB, supra note 16, at 20, 24.
115. MARY BETH NORTON, IN THE DEVIL’S SNARE: THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT CRISIS OF 1692, at
277 (Vintage Books 2003).
116. See generally CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1691). This is the colony’s second charter
granted to them following the Glorious Revolution as the first charter was revoked by James I before he
was deposed.
117. GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN
TRADITION AND DESIGN 35 (Univ. Press of Am. 1968).
118. See id; see also WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 146.
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applied without concern for the circumstances of the crime or the
characteristics of the defendant. 119 In Winthrop’s view, such rigidity
contradicted the biblical precept of mercy, while also failing to remedy one
of the major flaws of the Common Law. 120
The colony’s leaders, particularly Governor John Winthrop, opposed
the adoption of a legal code for fear that it would draw unwanted attention
from the authorities in London, as any code based on biblical law would
necessarily conflict with the Common Law. 121 As will be discussed in
section five, the adoption of laws inconsistent with the Common Law did in
fact open the colony up to investigation by the King. Although Winthrop
lost the fight and legal codes were adopted, the discretion of the magistrates
never waned. 122 Between the founding of the colony and its dissolution and
collapse into the Dominion of New England in 1684, there were three
different legal codes used: the Common Law of England (1630–1642), the
Body of Liberties (1642–1649), and the Laws and Liberties (1649–1683). 123
Under the new colonial laws, the overall goal of punishment in
Massachusetts Bay was transformed from retribution toward reform of the
offender as the desired end. 124 But, while constructing their model society,
the Puritans were faced with individuals and groups who did not conform
to their exacting standards. The colony’s leaders had to make a choice on
who could be reformed and who had to be purged from society.
IV. DIGNITY ABUSES AND DIGNITY TAKINGS UNDER THE LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY
The criminal conduct committed by the colonists was wide ranging
and of a varied nature—from failure to enclose their cattle to rape and
murder. Given this wide variety of criminality, two crimes will be the
focus: adultery and rape. These crimes represent a crime introduced by the
colonists (adultery), and a serious crime but not a traditional felony (rape).
In addition, they both have less variation than battery, theft, and
drunkenness, which varied according to the severity of the attack and the
amount stolen or consumed. Under Massachusetts law, rape did not include

119. See HASKINS, supra note 117, at 204.
120. See WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 314.
121. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP 167
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1958).
122. See generally ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 108–33.
123. KONIG, supra note 7, at 58–59, 104.
124. HASKINS, supra note 117, at 204. But see ERIKSON, supra note 9, at 197.
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fornication, which was treated separately. 125 Before a discussion of each of
these crimes, a general overview of the punishment scheme of
Massachusetts Bay will be discussed. As can be seen from the chart below,
most crimes were of a petty nature, which is why it is also necessary to
examine a few individual crimes in greater detail.
Most Frequently Occurring Crimes as Percent of Total Crimes,
1630–1683
ϳ͘ϲй

Absent Public Ordinance

ϲ͘ϲй

Drunk
Fornication

ϰ͘ϳй

Battery

ϰ͘ϲй

Fornication before Marriage

ϰ͘ϱй

Theft/Stealing

ϰ͘ϱй
ϰ͘Ϯй

Defamation
Ϯ͘ϰй

Disturbing the Peace
Failure to Prosecute

ϭ͘ϴй

Absent from Jury

ϭ͘ϴй

Lewdness

ϭ͘ϴй

Living Apart from Spouse

ϭ͘ϰй

Sabbath Breaking

ϭ͘ϰй

Failure to Appear in Court

ϭ͘ϯй

Lying

ϭ͘ϯй

Ϭ͘Ϭй

Ϯ͘Ϭй

Percent
of all
Crimes

ϰ͘Ϭй

ϲ͘Ϭй

ϴ͘Ϭй

Given that most crimes were of a petty nature, it follows that the most
common punishments were fines and simple admonishments. 126 However, there
still was a substantial group of punishments that were designed to dehumanize the
criminal. As discussed in section three, it is possible for a dignity taking to occur in
the context of criminal law. The key element will be proving that the punishment
inflicted by the state had the primary purpose or effect of dehumanizing or
infantilizing the criminal. 127

125. See ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 319–44.
126. Id.
127. ATUAHENE, supra note 10, at 21.
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A. Punishments
The change in the goal of punishment from retribution to reform is
reflected in the most common punishments imposed during the era. 128 The
colonists clearly sought to re-incorporate criminals within their society. As can be
seen in the chart below, the most common punishments across eras were fines
(2049 instances) and admonishments (328 instances). Admonishments were the
least harsh penalty, as it simply meant that the person would be publicly scolded
for their misbehavior. 129 Fines ranged from a few pence to several pounds
depending on the infraction. For example, in 1679, Richard Nags was fined ten
shillings for telling pernicious lies, 130 while in 1674, Richard Holmes was fined
four pounds for striking his wife with a stick. 131 In contrast only forty-one persons
were executed and ninety-two banished in this fifty-three-year span. 132

Most Commonly Imposed Punishments Compared to Death
and Acquittals 133

Punishment

Total

Fined
Admonished
Whipped
Restitution
Costs
Death
Acquitted

ʹǡͲͶͻ
͵ʹͺ
ʹͶ
ͳͷ
ͳͶͶ
Ͷͳ
͵ͶͶ

To
1642
ʹͳͲ
ͷͳ
ͺͶ
ͻ
ͳ͵
ͺ
ͷʹ

1642–
1649
͵ʹ

Ͷͺ
ͳͳ
ͺ

ͺͳ

1649–
1683
ͳǡͷͳ͵
ʹͲͳ
ͳͲͻ
ͳͶͺ
ͳʹʹ
ʹ
ͻͻ

The vast majority of punishments imposed in Massachusetts Bay focused
on the body of the defendant. The use of “scarlet letters” was not unheard of in the
colony, although they normally took the forms of simple pieces of paper worn by
the accused. For example, as punishment for burglary and lying, Susannah Buswell
was sentenced to pay a fine of six shillings and ordered to sit in the meeting house
with a paper pinned on her head with “for burglary and lying” in capital letters.134
The use of stocks, pillory, and bilbowes (a metal rod with hoops through which the
defendant’s wrists and ankles were fastened while they were sitting) as a method
of both shaming the accused and inflicting physical pain was not unheard of, and
can be seen as a steep increase in severity from simple letters. In terms of
dehumanization, the imposition of “scarlet letters,” was usually designed to
128. HASKINS, supra note 117, at 204.
129. KONIG, supra note 7, at 124–25.
130. 1 RCA, supra note 16, at 147.
131. 5 ECCR, supra note 16, at 31.
132. See ACEVEDO, supra note 8, at 319–44.
133. This chart only contains instances when a person was subjected to a single punishment in
order to illustrate the frequency of particular punishments. The majority of criminals were subjected to
only one punishment so most cases are captured in this chart.
134. 6 ECCR, supra note 16, at 265.

762

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:3

humiliate—not to dehumanize—the criminal as they were of a temporary nature.
More importantly, these shaming punishments were designed to replace the far
harsher punishments imposed by the Common Law of England.
The use of corporal punishment in the home and society at large was
common in early modern English society. 135 The use of whipping as a punishment
is therefore not terribly surprising; indeed, as can be seen from the chart above,
whipping was the third most commonly imposed punishment. In addition, many
criminals were given the option of paying a fine or being whipped because they
were persons of modest means and therefore unable to pay fines leveed by the
court against them. For example, Richard Praye was given the alternative of paying
fifty shillings for a series of offenses, or be whipped for beating his wife calling
her a jade and calling the magistrates roundheads. 136 Although the use of whipping
was common in English society, it was still designed to infantilize the criminal, as
it was usually reserved for men of lesser status who could not pay a fine. The Body
of Liberties states, “nor shall any true gentleman, nor any man equall to a
gentleman be punished with whipping, unles his crime be very shamefull, and his
course of life vitious and profligate.” 137
Rarer was the uses of maiming as a punishment in Massachusetts Bay,
although it was common in England. 138 In most instances, this took the form of
branding the convict. However, in the case of Philip Ratliffe, punishment was
more severe, as he was sentenced to be whipped, have both ears cut off, and then
be banished from the colony for the “moste foule scandalous invectives against our
Churches and Government.” 139 The primary goal of maiming was to perpetually
mark the criminal; therefore, it can be seen as dehumanizing, as there was no
possibility of reintegration into society, or indeed into any other society, as they
would carry the literal mark of their crime with them.
The heavy reliance on punishments that did not completely remove the
offender from society requires that death and banishment, the most severe
punishments possible under Massachusetts law, need to be explained as the
outliers. As can be seen from the chart below, the majority of persons sentenced to
death were convicted of murder and piracy, both of which were routinely punished
with death. 140 The infliction of death for the crimes of bestiality and witchcraft are
difficult to assess, as they were infrequent and punishable similarly in England. 141
The imposition of a death sentence for adultery, rape, and returning from
banishment will be discussed under each of those crimes in Part 4B.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

BAKER, supra note 2, at 484.
1 ECCR, supra note 16, at 136.
BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 43.
See generally BAKER, supra note 2.
WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 52; see also 1 RCMB, supra note 16, at 88.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 71.
Id. at 60; see also COKE, supra note 5, at 58.
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The two instances of death sentences for arson stand out, as they are the only
ones that were not connected to biblical law nor related to a religious quarrel—the
two persons executed for returning from banishment were Quakers. 142 Arson was
punishable with death by hanging under the Common Law of England. 143
However, in Massachusetts, the most common punishment for arson was
banishment, followed by fine, with death as an outlier. Arson was an uncommon
crime, only being prosecuted twenty-eight times; fifteen of those instances
stemmed from two incidents. One distinction that can be made is between those
cases in which the person was accused of burning homes versus other materials.
For example, Ruben Guppy was ordered to pay restitution and was fined for setting
fire to fences. 144 Henry Stevens was ordered to serve additional time as a servant
for burning down the barn of his master John Humfrey. 145 This leaves the
instances where the person burned a dwelling.

142.
143.
144.
145.

4 RCMB, supra note 16, at 419; see also 3 RCA, supra note 16, at 93–111.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 222–23.
1 ECCR, supra note 16, at 68.
4 RCMB, supra note 16, at 311.
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Punishment

As mentioned before, the majority of arson cases stemmed from two
instances, one of which occurred in 1679, when a group of eleven persons
attempted to set fire to the town of Boston. Their motives were not recorded, but
all were found guilty and banished from the colony. 146 The more interesting
episode occurred two years later, when four African slaves were accused of
intentionally setting fire to the homes of Thomas Swann of Roxbury, William
Clark of North Hampton, and Doctors Wan and Lamb, both of Roxbury. 147 From
the records, it is clear that the magistrates believed that the arsons were
coordinated. If true, then this is likely the first instance of slave rebellion in
continental English North America (though further research would be needed).
There is some indication that the fires were coordinated, as all of them were started
by getting hot coals or brands from the hearth and swinging them around to set the
home alight. 148 The four slaves were all convicted: two, Chafaleer and an unnamed
slave, were banished from the colony. A third, Jack, was ordered to be hung, then
his body burnt; and the final individual, Marja, was ordered to be executed by
burning at the stake. 149 It is not clear if this horrific punishment was actually
carried out, but if it was, it would be the only instance in which this occurred. The
execution of Jack and Marja seem to be designed to dehumanize the criminal,
rather than simply punish them, on two grounds. First, the imposition of a death
sentence was out of the ordinary for this type of crime and indicate that the state
was taking more than they needed to (death rather than banishment). Second, the
manner of the execution, burning at the stake or burning the body after death, was
extraordinary in Massachusetts, as no other criminal was ordered to suffer a similar
fate. In this instance, the execution of Jack and Marja serves no legitimate public
purpose that could not have also been achieved with banishment or even death in
the usual sense of simple hanging.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 25051; see also 1 RCA, supra note 16, at 145.
1 RCA, supra note 16, at 197–99.
Id.
Id.
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B. Crimes
As mentioned in the previous section, the imposition of death in adultery
cases was also unusual. Adultery was made a capital crime under the Body of
Liberties in 1641; before then, it was severely punished with whipping.
Banishment was imposed in the cases of Margaret Seale, John Hathaway, and
Robert Allen, while Sara Hales was ordered to sit on the gallows before being
banished. 150 The likely addition of the sitting on the gallows in Hales case is
because she was convicted in September of 1641 when drafts of the new legal code
making adultery a capital offense were circulating. 151 It should be noted that this is
an example where the state acts coercively against a person’s body and indeed
enacts a taking, in the sense that it intruded onto the body, but does not reach the
level of a dignity taking as there was no dehumanization, simply humiliation.
The first couple caught after the passage of the new act, Mary Latham and
James Britton, were convicted and hung. 152 However, after this initial incident,
juries were reluctant to convict persons of adultery even with overwhelming
evidence; instead, they convicted individuals of the lesser crime of suspicion of
adultery, which is the primary reason that no one else was executed. 153 In one
sense, the execution of Latham and Britton did act as a clear indicator of the
magistrate’s intention to treat adultery seriously. The unwillingness of juries to
convict subsequent adulterers—there would be twenty-eight persons subsequently
charged—indicates that the punishment was out of sync with the severity of the
crime in the minds of the jurors. Interestingly, instances of adultery occurred
approximately once every eleven months before the executions (eleven cases in
twelve years) and only once every eight months after the executions (twenty-eight
cases in thirty-nine years); whether two lives were worth this reduction is
debatable, but tends to indicate that these were arguably instances of a dignity
taking, as the punishment was severely disproportionate to the crime as evidenced
by its lack of subsequent implementation.
The crime of rape is particularly difficult one for which to compare
punishments, as both the attributes of the victim and defendant can play a role in
aggravating or mitigating the crime. For example, Jonathan Thing was severely
whipped for raping a girl of eight years old because he was a boy at the time. 154 Of
the three persons executed for rape, the triggering factor in two of the cases was
that the rape involved a breach of the master–servant relationship. Basto, an
African slave, was ordered executed for raping Martha Cox, the daughter of his
master. 155 On the reverse side of the relationship, William Cheny was executed for
the rape of Experience Holdbrooke, his servant. 156 This seems to indicate that the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

1 RCMB, supra note 16, at 225, 335.
Id. at 335; see also 2 RCA, supra note 16, at 139.
WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 500–02; see also 2 RCA, supra note 16, at 139.
See, e.g., WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 60911.
Id. at 361.
1 RCA, supra note 16, at 74.
Id. at 199.
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added instability to society caused by breaches of the social order were singled out
for especially severe treatment.
The earlier cases of John Hudson, Daniel Fairfield, and Jenkin Davis for
having sex with Dorcas Humphry also seem to bear this out. The court desperately
wanted to execute the three men because Humphry had not reached maturity, but
they were saved because Humphry admitted that she consented to fornication. 157
Instead, the court ordered Hudson to be whipped at Boston and Lynn and pay
twenty pounds restitution to the family. Davis was ordered whipped at Boston and
Lynn, to pay forty pounds restitution, confined to the town of Lynn, and ordered to
wear a hemp rope around his neck. Although a humiliating punishment, it was not
a dignity taking, as it was not designed to dehumanize Davis. The most severe
punishment was reserved for Fairfield, who was ordered whipped at Boston and
Salem, pay forty pounds restitution, confined to Boston Neck, made to wear a
hemp rope around his neck and have one nostril slit and seared in Boston and
Salem. 158 Although a severe crime, the punishments inflicted appear to go beyond
what was necessary; Fairfield’s maiming was designed to dehumanize him by
permanently marking him as being apart from the community, and therefore served
as a dignity taking. If situated in the context of similarly situated criminals—those
that raped children—then the punishments become more reasonable as one was
whipped, 159 another banished and sold as a slave, 160 and a final person acquitted
but banished anyway. 161 The court seems to have acknowledged that it may have
gone too far in its punishment, as Davis and Fairfield were relieved of their
confinement and the wearing of the ropes. 162 Given the severity with which the
other individuals were punished, the unusual nature of those inflicted on Davis and
Hudson may have been inappropriate but likely did not rise to a dignity taking. The
irreversible maiming of Fairfield, however, was a dignity taking, especially in light
of the court’s subsequent reversal of some of the lesser punishments.
This brief sampling of criminal acts from Massachusetts Bay shows the
difficulty in identifying when a harsh punishment becomes a dignity taking.
However, a line can be established based on when a punishment crosses from
humiliation to dehumanization or infantilization of the criminal. Unlike England,
where an entire classification of action toward criminals acted as a dignity taking
because the crime involved dispossession of property, Massachusetts Bay posed
the more modern dilemma of when to classify criminal punishment as a dignity
taking because the property destroyed or taken was the body. In each of these three
crimes (arson, rape, and adultery), there are individual incidents that seem to cross
from a legitimate punishment into a dignity taking, but each is a close case. The
clearest examples of dignity takings in colonial Massachusetts were the executions
of Mary Latham and James Britton for adultery, Jack and Marja’s executions for
arson, as well as the maiming of Fairfield for his transgressions against Dorcas
Humphry. In each of these instances, there were severe transgressions on the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

2 RCA, supra note 16, at 121; see also WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 370.
WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 37374.
4 RCMB, supra note 16, at 212.
3 RCA, supra note 16, at 21617.
1 RCA, supra note 16, at 158.
3 RCMB, supra note 16, at 67.
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bodies of the defendants, especially when compared to the punishments meted out
to similarly-situated defendants. Although there were numerous punishments
imposed on the body of the defendants, these did not rise to the level of dignity
takings; in the seventeenth century, such punishments were not only common, but
represented mercy when compared to the death sentences imposed in Europe. It
should of course be noted that such punishments, if used in contemporary
Massachusetts, would certainly constitute a dignity taking.

V. CONCLUSION
The concept of a dignity taking can be extended to include certain criminal
sanctions. In the seventeenth century, dignity takings occurred when the state took
the estates of felons after they were publicly executed in a dehumanizing manner,
or when the state executed for minor crimes or in a manner designed to inflict
dehumanization. These takings affected both the criminal and their families.
Although early American colonists removed this blatant dignity taking in their
early legal codes when they ended the Bloody Code, corruption of blood, and
quartering of traitors, they did not fully remove dehumanizing punishments from
their criminal system. To examine modern forms of punishment, it is necessary to
expand the definition of property covered in dignity takings to include the
destruction of an individual’s body alongside the annihilation of an individual’s
body. 163 In colonial Massachusetts Bay, certain punishments were designed to
dehumanize the criminal (maiming) or infantilize them (whipping). Other
punishments such as the imposition of “scarlet letters” and other shaming
punishments (sitting on the gallows, wearing hemp ropes) were humiliating, but
did not rise to the level of dignity takings. Future research needs to be conducted
on contemporary criminal punishments to determine when they cross from the
legitimate role into a dignity taking. In particular, the extrajudicial killing of
suspects by police officers appears to be an area of essential inquiry.
This study also shows the limit of the concept of dignity takings, for it is not
clear if the idea could be pushed into the sixteenth century or earlier. This is an
example of the fundamental conflict between law being contextual and being
universal. As the Introduction set forth, once society becomes more equal, then
dignity became more universal. Although Anglo-American society is still
struggling to live up to the ideals articulated more than three hundred years ago,
the colonists of Massachusetts Bay advocated for greater dignity in criminal
punishments when compared to their brethren in England. They were far from
perfect, but they started the process of recognizing the need for mercy in criminal
punishment and persons’ dignities.

163. Atuahene, supra note 13, at 1438.

